In this paper I defend the tenability of the Thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. This is done by adopting the view that the interpretation of a conditional may differ from context to context. Several triviality results are (re-)evaluated in this view as providing natural constraints on probabilities for conditionals and admissible changes in the interpretation. The contextsensitive approach is also used to re-interpret some of the intuitive rules for conditionals and probabilities such as Bayes' rule, Import-Export, and Modus Ponens. I will show that, contrary to consensus, the Thesis is in fact compatible with these re-interpreted rules.
protected against possible floods.
3 Therefore it is safe to conclude that, at least under certain constraints, it is still possible to uphold the Thesis. 4 But what exactly are the costs of upholding the Thesis? This question is investigated by taking up the Thesis as a premise, and by then studying its consequences. Thus in this text a probability function will mostly be a function that obeys some standard probability rules and the Thesis. This means that one or more of the assumptions have to be identified and rejected in any argument against the Thesis. I argue that for all of the discussed arguments, it is sufficient to reject the (implicit) assumption of the context-independent interpretation of the conditional. However, by rejecting this assumption, several intuitive rules about conditionals and probabilities need to be re-evaluated in a context-sensitive reading. It is shown that Bayes' rule (BR), Import-Export (IE) and Modus Ponens (MP) can be maintained alongside the Thesis, provided they are understood in a context-sensitive way.
What is lacking in this paper is an account of how exactly the changes in interpretation take place and how they should be understood.
5 Rather, a more top-down approach is adopted to obtain constraints for such accounts if they are to be compatible with the Thesis and other rules. The advantage of this approach is that it shows that there is still much room for discussion on conditionals even if one adopts the Thesis. The upshot is that the costs of upholding the Thesis are, arguably, quite low.
Section 2.1 elaborates on how the Thesis is understood in this paper and introduces some of the tools that will be used. Section 2.2 deals with the original triviality result by Lewis and a recent strengthening due to Hájek. In section 2.3 the notion of context-sensitivity is introduced and in section 2.4 this idea is made explicit in the notation, and an update rule is derived under the assumption of BR. Section 2.5 elaborates on the possibilities for interpretation-changes in relation with the notion of moderation. In section 3 IE is adopted as an additional premise and further tension, in particular with MP (sections 3.2 and 3.3), is investigated. In section 4 the main results are recapitulated and some hints for future work are given.
Conflicts with updating 2.1 Orienting investigations
In this section I formulate how the Thesis is understood throughout this paper and further introduce some formal tools among which Karnaugh maps. The Thesis is an assumption about the probability one should assign to a conditional. One of the earlier expressions is found in the work of Ramsey: If two people are arguing 'If p, will q?' and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q [. . . ] We can say they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p (Ramsey, 1931, p. 247 ).
In the language of probabilistic epistemology this can be reformulated to if 0 < P (A) < 1, then P (A → φ) = P A (φ),
where P is any probability function (specifying one's degrees of belief) and P A expresses the probability function obtained after updating on A. Here I adopt the convention (also used by McGee (1989) ) that upper case Roman letters (A, B, C, . . .) denote sentences that do not contain 3 The most prominent of these results are (van Fraassen, 1976; McGee, 1989; Stalnaker & Jeffrey, 1994; Kaufmann, 2009; Bradley, 2012) , each of them making their own compromises w.r.t. the results mentioned in the previous footnote.
4 While in this paper I (implicitly) restrict attention to indicative conditionals, it deserves to be noted that a parallel discussion exists for counterfactuals c.f. (Williams, 2012; Leitgeb, 2012; Briggs, 2014) . For texts that embed discussion of Thesis in the context of more general work on conditionals I recommend the works of Edgington (1995) and Bennett (2003) .
5 This is in contrast to much of the earlier work on context-sensitive conditionals, e.g., (Stalnaker, 1975; Harper, 1976; Lindström, 1996; Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1996; Gillies, 2009 ). a conditional and lower case Greek letters (φ, ψ, χ, . . .) denote sentences that may (but need not) contain a conditional.
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The precise relation between the probability functions P A and P will be an important point of discussion. At any rate, the most common relation is given by what I call Bayes' rule (BR) which states that the updated probability function is obtained by conditioning:
If 0 < P (A), then P A (φ) = P (φ|A) := P (A ∧ φ)
where the last equality is the definition of conditional probability. When combining (1) and (2) one obtains the traditional form of the Thesis if 0 < P (A) < 1, then P (A → φ) = P (φ|A).
Since the general validity of BR will be a topic of debate, it deserves to be stressed that with the Thesis I will always mean (1). This reading of Ramsey's proposal has quite some appeal as illustrated by van Fraassen's classical example:
What is the probability that I throw a six if I throw an even number, if not the probability that: if I throw an even number, it will be a six? (van Fraassen, 1976, p. 273) .
Additionally, there is also much empirical support.
7 But despite this appeal, the Thesis is struggling for survival.
To elucidate the problems surrounding the Thesis, a possible worlds approach is adopted. With every φ in some set of sentences L, one associates a subset vφw of the total set of possible worlds Ω. The map from L to subsets of Ω is called an interpretation function.
8 For the Boolean operations this association is assumed to satisfy the usual rules
where denotes a tautology and v w = Ω. Consequently, if L is closed under Boolean operations, then (4) ensures that the image of the interpretation function constitutes a Boolean algebra A of subsets of Ω. On the other hand, no rules will be assumed on how the set vA → Bw relates to the sets vAw and vBw. For two atomic sentences A and B, the full scope of relevant sets of possible worlds can conveniently be depicted using a Karnaugh map:
As implicitly indicated by (1) I will mainly focus on updates on non-conditionals in this paper. 7 See for instance (Hadjichristidis et al., 2001; Evans et al., 2003; Over & Evans, 2003; Weidenfeld et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2007; Oberauer et al., 2007; Douven & Verbrugge, 2010 , 2013 .
8 The idea to identify sentences or propositions with sets at least dates back to the works of Boole and Venn. The standard way to make the identification with sets of possible worlds is to construct the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra from some language L. If L obeys classical logic this algebra will be Boolean. Stone's representation theorem then shows that this algebra can be identified with an algebra of sets. The set vAw associated with a sentence A ∈ L may be understood as representing the proposition expressed by the sentence A as logically equivalent sentences will be associated with the same set. Although the idea behind this construction is embraced in this paper, the set Ω obtained by it will not have a rich enough structure. This is because in this paper the conditional is typically not the material implication. Thus I will tacitly assume that Ω will be 'big' enough for the constructions introduced without ever explicitly constructing Ω.
9 These graphical tools were first introduced in (Karnaugh, 1953) for their convenience with studying logic circuits. The key difference with Venn diagrams is that while the latter focuses on atomic propositions, Karnaugh maps put more emphasis on the atoms in the Boolean lattice of propositions (i.e., the 'maximal' conjunctions). The advantage of using Karnaugh maps in connection with probability theory, is that a specification of the probabilities of all the atoms fully determines the probability function on the Boolean lattice, whereas the same does not hold for a specification of the probabilities of all atomic propositions.
Here the total rectangle represents the total set of possible worlds, the first row the set vA → Bw, the second row the set v¬(A → B)w, etc. Presumptions about what rules should hold for the conditional may rule out some of the possibilities in (5). For example, one may wish to maintain modus ponens (MP) by requiring that it is not possible that A is true and A → B is true and B is false, thereby requiring that the set of possible worlds represented by the upper left corner is empty. However, I will only adopt such constraints when they become relevant for the discussion and until then leave as much room as possible. Only then a clear view on what the Thesis requires can be achieved.
A probability function P on L can be obtained by specifying a probability measure π on A, the subsets of possible worlds in the Karnaugh map. Systematically this measure can be depicted as A
with 0 ≤ p i , q i ≤ 1 and
For example, from this diagram one can easily read that µ(vAw∩vBw) = p 2 . The relations (7) pose necessary and sufficient conditions for the assignments to obey the laws of probability, i.e., for π to be a probability measure. 10 The probability function P : L → [0, 1] can now be determined by the probability measure π via the equation
Although this identity may seem trivial now, the distinction between P and π will become helpful along the way. In particular, since no prior assumptions are made on how the set vA → Bw algebraically relates to other sets of possible worlds, it is useful to have this two level description of assigning probabilities to conditionals. Classically, when a probability function is specified for a collection of sentences generated by two atomic sentences A and B, only the numbers p 1 , . . . , p 4 are specified, whereas the values one should take for q 1 , . . . , q 4 are still open for discussion. The Thesis may now be viewed as an additional rule for a function to be a probability function similar to how the rule
relates the logical connectives ∨ and ∧ to the probability calculus. To be specific, the Thesis demands the following relation for the q i 's:
This relation will simply be taken as an additional premise for probability functions that comes in play as soon as probabilities of conditionals are to be considered. Thus, while (7) ensures that π is a probability measure, it is not enough to ensure that P is a probability function. With this background set, it is now time to study the consequences of the premise (10).
Constraints on update rules
The most famous result that argues against the Thesis comes from Lewis' 1976 paper. 10 Formally, a probability measure is also required to satisfy σ-additivity, but that notion will play no role in this paper.
Theorem 2.1 (Lewis 1976) . Let L be a set of sentences closed under the Boolean operations ∨, ∧ and ¬. Further, let P be a set of probability functions on L that satisfy (3) and that is closed under conditioning (i.e. if P ∈ P and A ∈ L with P (A) > 0, then P (.|A) ∈ P). Then, for any pair A, B ∈ L with A → B ∈ L and every P ∈ P with 0 < P (A ∧ B) < 1 and 0 < P (A ∧ ¬B) < 1
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. First apply (3) to the conditional A → B:
Now apply the law of total probability (this is justified because L is assumed to be closed under Boolean operations):
Finally, apply (3) to the conditional probabilities. For the first term in the right-hand side of (13) this results in
A similar calculation gives P (A → B|¬B) = 0 and this finishes the proof.
The crucial step in the proof is the third, where it is used that P (.|B) and P (.|¬B) are probability functions. This becomes clearer when looking at the Karnaugh map of, say, the first one, which is given by A
Here, the probability of every sentence incompatible with B is set to zero, and the others are rescaled by the factor P (B) = p 2 + p 3 . The constraint on the values for the q i provided by the Thesis then becomes
This entails that q 2 = q 3 = 1. A similar argument for P (.|¬B) entails q 1 = q 4 = 0, together establishing that the prior probability distribution should be given by the trivial values
It thus follows that the Thesis can only be maintained in a non-trivial manner if either the general validity of Bayes' rule is dropped (upholding the validity of (1) while preventing the use of (3) in the proof), or the assumption that the class of probability functions is closed under conditionalization is dropped. These two assumptions are of course closely related. The second one is only interesting under the assumption that closure under conditionalization encodes closure under updating or some other operation that is supposed to preserve rationality. Thus the transition from P (.) to P (.|A) can no longer be maintained as a rule for updating on A (because updating is supposed to preserve rationality). Obviously this cries out for an explanation from the defender of the Thesis. I will postpone a discussion on this issue until after treating a recent result due to Hájek which puts some more constraints on possible update rules. The difficulties posed by Lewis' result can then be dealt with in tandem with those posed by Hájek's result. Theorem 2.2 (Hájek 2011) . Let L be a set of sentences closed under Boolean operations that further contains all first order conditionals (i.e. A → B ∈ L for all A, B ∈ L). Suppose P is a non-trivial probability function on L that satisfies (3). Further suppose that there is an update rule that satisfies for every φ:
Boldness: P φ (φ) = 1 whenever P (φ) > 0, Moderation: For any ψ with P (ψ) > 0 and ψ |= φ: P φ (ψ) > 0, where P φ denotes the probability function after updating. Then there is a χ ∈ L with P (χ) > 0 such that P χ does not satisfy(3).
Proof. Suppose P is non-trivial for the sentences A and B. That is, 0 < p
Now there are two possibilities. Either q 2 > 0 or q 2 = 0. In the first case take χ := A ∧ B ∧ ¬(A → B) and note that P (χ) = q 2 p 2 > 0. Then because of boldness
while on the other hand
In the second case take χ := ¬(A ∧ B) (which has positive probability because p 1 > 0) and set γ := χ ∧ (A → B). Clearly γ |= χ. Furthermore, P (γ) > 0:
Then, because of moderation, P χ (γ) > 0. And since γ |= A → B,
On the other hand one can show that
To do this one first needs to check that this conditional probability is defined (i.e., P χ (A) > 0). For this note that A ∧ ¬B |= χ and
Thus while Lewis proved that conditionalization as an update rule is incompatible with the Thesis (in conjunction with BR), Hájek has strengthened this result by showing that the same conclusion holds for any update rule that is both bold and moderate. On the other hand, both assumptions are supposed to be natural requirements for an update rule. Indeed, if one learns φ it makes sense to fully believe φ thereafter. Moderation is a bit harder to motivate. The idea is that if ψ |= φ, then learning φ should count as evidence for ψ, or at least not as strong counter evidence. At any rate, learning φ should not cause one to suddenly disbelieve ψ.
The proofs further raises the question whether it is possible at all to have an update rule which is compatible with the Thesis. Obviously, if the rule is wild enough it is possible.
11 But preferably one wants a rule that satisfies some constraints. And above all, one wants to know what is wrong with the constraints adopted by Lewis and Hájek. This will be the topic of the following sections.
11 If one is stubborn enough one could just take P φ = P .
Going contextual
For the defense of the Thesis given in this paper it is important to remember van Fraassen's criticism of Lewis' proof. When it comes to evaluating the functions P (.|B) and P (.|¬B) in the third step as revised probability functions, van Fraassen identified the hidden assumption that it should be possible to make this revision by changing the probability measure alone -and not the constitution of the possible worlds or the nearness relation on them (van Fraassen, 1976, p. 274 ).
In particular, van Fraassen can be taken to suggest that an update may not only involve a change in the probability function, but also in the set of possible worlds vA → Bw associated with the conditional. Such a change entails that one can no longer compare maps like (6) and (15) since not every rectangle may represent the same set of possible worlds. In particular, the set of possible worlds given by the first row in (15) may be the set of possible worlds in which A → B is true before the update, but not necessarily the set of possible worlds in which A → B is true after the update.
The adoption of context-sensitivity also casts doubt on the impact of Hájek's theorem. It is particularly tricky in connection with Hájek's assumption that one can update on a conditional. For example, boldness requires that P A→B (A → B) = 1, where the two instances of the conditional may now no longer refer to the same set of possible worlds. Further, in connection with moderation, the proof makes use of the assumption that if ψ |= φ, the interpretation of ψ does not change after updating on φ. How else can one motivate that the probability P φ (ψ) should be greater than zero given P (ψ) > 0? This issue will be taken up more concretely in section 2.5 after the context has been made explicit in the notation in section 2.4.
Apart from the merits of introducing context-sensitivity hinted at above, one might also raise objections against this introduction. I will only mention one of them because it fits well in the present discussion. Allowing interpretation changes appears to invite an immense range of new possibilities. So much in fact, that one may fear that the formalization of the conditional reaches a level of abstractness to the point of becoming void of meaning. This reflects Lewis' objection against this loophole in his triviality result. He stated that presumably our indicative conditional has a fixed interpretation, the same for speakers with different beliefs, and for one speaker before and after a change in his beliefs. Else how are disagreements about a conditional possible, or changes of mind? (Lewis, 1976, p. 301) .
Indeed, the introduction of context-sensitivity raises the question of how BR should be applied to conditionals. Consider the equality
Intuitively, the left-hand side gives the measure of the set of worlds vA → Bw after the update. The key of BR is to relate this value to the prior belief function P via the rule
A straightforward implementation of this rule suggests the use of the measure π(vC w ∩ v A → Bw), where vA → Bw now denotes the set of possible worlds associated with A → B before the update. One may wonder however, whether it is not more natural to use the evaluation of the posterior interpretation of the conditional in light of the old degrees of belief (see also section 2.5). At any rate, it seems that by introducing context-sensitivity changing beliefs (and even implementing BR) has become an ambiguous enterprise. In the next section however (and also in section 3.3) I will show that, to some extent, the opposite seems to be the case; the Thesis together with an additional assumption already fix the value of P C (A → B). In addition the Thesis already imposes severe constraints on changes in the interpretation. The additional assumption concerns a restriction of BR to non-conditionals (which is just (2)). Indeed, since I will assume that the interpretation of non-conditionals remains fixed, an adoption of BR for non-conditionals is straightforward.
12 This restricted form will be termed Bayes' Minimal Rule (BMR).
Introducing contexts
To get a clear grip on the issues raised in the previous section, a notation for keeping track of the interpretation needs to be introduced. The discussion thus far indicates that one's interpretation of the conditional and one's degrees of belief are intertwined in the sense that one's interpretation may change whenever one's degrees of belief change.
13 This can be modeled by assuming that they are both determined by the context C one adopts. When this is made explicit in the notation the Thesis states that
where C A denotes the context after updating on A. An update in the probability function is now thus viewed as a consequence of an update in the context. But obviously, such an update can now also be seen to influence the interpretation of the conditional. That is, one may now write the update as
Thus both changes are now viewed as a consequence of a single change; one in the context.
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The question of an update rule for conditionals now boils down to determining the value of P C A (B − − → C, this is an impossible task. However, the following theorem shows that a few simple constraints already entirely fix this value.
Theorem 2.3. Let L be a set of sentences closed under Boolean operations and let C be a collection of contexts such that for every C ∈ C P C is a probability function on L. Suppose further that L contains all simple conditionals and that C is closed under updating 15 . Then, if the update rule satisfies for all A, B, C
then the probability function P C A satisfies
12 The motto is to extend the theory of probability to conditionals while taking the Thesis as a guide, not to reformulate it to save the Thesis.
13 The idea that probability updates and changes in the interpretation are intertwined is inspired by Romeijn (2012) where it is used to develop a Bayesian approach for a problem case in dynamic epistemic logic.
14 It is not my aim to set out a theory of what contexts are; the notion is here primarily used as a placeholder. Formally though, one may think of the context C as the pair (π C , I C ) with π C the probability measure on (Ω, A) and I C : L → A the interpretation function associating sentences with sets of possible worlds. These together determine the probability function P C on L. Because the interpretation function is assumed to remain constant over the non-conditional elements of L for varying contexts, one can conveniently keep most of the discussion in the language of (L, P C ) as long as the context-dependence of conditionals is made explicit in the notation. So for example A C − → B serves as a reminder that when referring to the set of possible worlds vA → Bw one adopts the interpretation function I C . The notation should not be taken to imply that for example A C − → B and A C −→ B refer to distinct elements of L. As such, it merely is a change in notation.
15 For every A ∈ L and C ∈ C, C A ∈ C.
Proof. Suppose P C (A ∧ B) > 0. The result follows by writing out:
It should be emphasized that this result is independent of the precise form of the change in the interpretation of the conditional. Consequently, it poses a natural constraint for any account of conditionals that satisfy the Thesis. But even though this result completely fixes the posterior probability of a conditional, the introduction of changing contexts still allows for a lot of possibilities in obtaining a full account of conditionals and probabilities thereof. This will be discussed further in the following section.
A tentative proposal for context-changes
What remains an open question at this point is how the new set of possible worlds vB C A − − → Cw relates to the old set vB C − → Cw. This is not a question I will be answering in this paper. However, I will sketch some possibilities to show the sort of elbow room available at this point, which may serve as inspiration for future research. In addition I will connect the update rule (28) to Hájek's theorem.
First of all, it is interesting to note that if one rejects the context-sensitivity, and demands that the two sets should coincide in all cases, one recovers the update rule proposed by McGee (1989) and also advocated by Bradley (2011) . That is, in a non-contextual reading, the update rule
is a necessary consequence of BMR. Now because of Theorem 2.2, this rule must violate either boldness or moderation. Since BMR is maintained, no violation of boldness occurs for updates on non-conditionals. Updating on conditionals on the other hand, has not been defined by (28), and an investigation of possible extensions of this rule to incorporate such updates is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus the eyes are now fixed on moderation. This is indeed violated by (30) because B ∧ ¬(A → B) |= B while P B (B ∧ ¬(A → B)) = 0. 16 It would be interesting to see an argument defending this behavior.
If one does allow interpretation changes for the conditional, investigating moderation becomes more complex (cf the discussion below Theorem 2.2). Of course it is still the case for (28) that for every context C (and its update C B )
But it is not clear whether this should be viewed as a violation of moderation since the two conditionals are now distinct in the sense that they refer to different sets of possible worlds. Indeed, the rule of moderation tacitly assumes context-independence, and so does its motivation. To argue that φ |= A implies that A should count as evidence for φ (motivating that P C A (φ) > 0), one assumes that the interpretation of φ stays the same after learning A. And that is precisely what is at stake here. Further there is the question of whether the pre-condition that φ should have probability greater than zero can be met. Ideally, one would evaluate the 'probability' P C (B ∧ ¬(A 
− − → B). That is, to
16 Strictly speaking the probability P B (B ∧ ¬(A → B)) has not been defined thus far in this paper. However, it seems safe to assume that in any case it is less than or equal to P B (¬ (A → B) ) which in turn may be taken to be equal to 1 − P B (A → B)=0. evaluate in the prior context the probability of the posterior conditional. The scare quotes denote that it is not clear how to make sense of this.
17 One possibility would be to calculate
Such a valuation again asks for an implementation of the interpretation change. I will now make a simple yet insightful proposal. It is inspired by the Ramsey test; the idea that evaluating a conditional B C A − − → C involves evaluating C in a context in which first of all A holds, and then B is added to the stock of belief. Specifically,
A consequence of this relation is that
where the second step holds because the Thesis implies the conditional law of excluded middle. If A and B are compatible, then this simply becomes a contradiction. The pre-condition for moderation (assigning a positive measure to vB w ∩ v A C B − − → Bw c ) thus cannot be met.
Assumption (33) can also be used to establish a clearer relationship between the update rule (28) and BR. To be precise, while the Thesis forces to give up conditionalization as the method for updating the probability function, (33) does allow one to maintain BR as the update rule for the probability measure. An additional assumption adopted to establish this result is McGee's Simple Independence Principle:
That is, if A and B are logically incompatible, then A is stochastically independent of B C − → C. Note that this is equivalent to the statement that if B |= A, then A is stochastically independent of B C − → C, which is the version used in the calculation below. With these assumptions in place, and with making use of (8), one now has
This shows that the update rule (28) can be understood as the occurrence of two updates taking place simultaneously. The first one works on the level of the possible worlds. The probability measure π C on (Ω, A) is updated by conditioning on vAw, i.e., π C A (.) = π C (.|vAw). This is simply BR. The second update applies to the interpretation function I C : L → A and is given by (33).
To recap, the proposal (33) first of all shows that the notion of moderation is indeed unsatisfactory and ambiguous in the light of context-changes (as argued in section 2.3). But perhaps more 17 Indeed, I am tempted to say that P C (B∧¬(A C B − − → B)) is a sloppy abuse of notation making use of an illegitimate mixing of contexts. interestingly, it shows that although Lewis proved that the set of probability functions cannot be closed under conditionalization (except for trivial cases), the set of probability measures may well be closed under conditionalization. And this precisely elucidates van Fraassen's criticism of Lewis' proof, namely, that not conditionalization by itself is a flawed rule, but that the probabilities aren't the only things that need updating. With these results I feel it is safe to say that the rule (33) provides an interesting candidate for explicating context changes. And in section 3.4 I will show some other interesting properties of this proposal.
However, the main point of this paper is not to argue for a single specific way to maintain the Thesis. Rather, it is that the notation introduced in section 2.4, and the further discussion in the present section, show that the idea of context-sensitivity provides valuable possibilities for accounts of probabilities of conditionals. The tenability of the Thesis is far from being an openand-shut case from this perspective. However, the story is far from finished, and in the following section I will raise the bar a bit higher by leaving the domain of simple conditionals to also consider right-nested conditionals.
3 Conflicts with Import-Export
Triviality without updates
In the previous section most of the discussion was devoted to rules for updating. This is because the theorems discussed require that the Thesis can again be applied to the updated probability function. In Lewis' proof it was assumed that this update should be given by BR. At least, this is what motivates the assumption that the collection of probability functions should be closed under conditionalization. The proof of Hájek further shows that there are also problems for a wide class of other update rules. However, these results rely on the assumption that the interpretation of the conditional remains fixed under updates. But as I (and others before me, e.g. (Stalnaker, 1975; Harper, 1976; Lindström, 1996; Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1996; Gillies, 2009) ) have argued, this is not an innocent assumption. Indeed, there are plausible ways to avoid the theorems by rejecting it.
Although I don't think it is known as such, there is a quick fix to Lewis' proof that avoids the assumption that the interpretation remains fixed during an update.
18 Due to the adjustment in the proof of Lewis, the requirement that P is closed under conditionalization (or any other form of updating) may be dropped. More specifically, the proof of this result requires only that the Thesis holds for a single probability function. And since no update takes place in the proof, it holds irrespective of whether one believes that the interpretation of the conditional should remain fixed during the update procedure. Thus, for notational convenience, I will drop the 'C' in the discussion of this result.
Of course the fix comes with a price tag. As an additional constraint for the conditional, the law of import-export (IE) is assumed, namely
Consequently, it is now necessary to also consider right-nested conditionals, whereas the proofs of Lewis and Hájek only consider first order conditionals. Leaving the domain of simple conditionals requires reconsidering the difference between the two formulations of the Thesis (1) and (3) especially since the general validity of BR has been contested. The following theorem makes use of the second formulation of the Thesis which I will conveniently dub the Conditionalization Thesis.
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Note that this assumption is not the same as assuming that BR does hold after all because one may deny the general validity of (1). Indeed, the results of the previous section pose no immediate constraints on how to assign probabilities to nested conditionals.
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Theorem 3.1. Let L be a set of sentences closed under Boolean operations and that contains simple conditionals and nested conditionals of second order. Furthermore, suppose that → satisfies IE. Then, if P is a probability function on L that satisfies the Conditionalization Thesis, one has P (B|A) = P (B) (37) whenever 0 < P (A ∧ B) < 1 and 0 < P (A ∧ ¬B) < 1.
Proof. The first two steps are identical to the ones in the proof of Theorem 2.1 which results in
The third step is now replaced by first applying the Conditionalization Thesis to the conditionals B → (A → B) and ¬B → (A → B):
With the use of IE and applying the Thesis again one then has
Plugging these results back into (38) gives the desired result.
The most straightforward response for the defender of the (Conditionalization) Thesis would be to put the blame on one of the new assumptions. Since many will agree that second order conditionals at least in some cases do make sense, it seems that the only real candidate is IE. This is the route followed for instance by Kaufmann (2009) . In my opinion, however, it is not a pleasant route. IE seems to have the same kind of appeal as the Thesis itself; in conceivable situations it just sounds right. So it is unclear why one would attack either one only in favor of upholding the other.
But even if one does not accept the universal validity of IE, there are still reasons to reject the route of Kaufmann. What is required to save the Thesis on this route is not an argument that shows that IE is not universally valid; a single counter example will not do. Instead, what is required is an argument showing that IE fails for all instances that give rise to conflict with the Thesis. Now admittedly the occurrences in the above proof (B → (A → B) = (B ∧ A) → B and ¬B → (A → B) = (¬B ∧ A) → B) are somewhat artificial. But these are not the only instances that give rise to conflict with the Thesis (as will become clear in the next section). And obtaining a classification of all instances of IE excluded by the Thesis is no trivial matter, let alone showing that in all these cases IE fails. Another option would then be to argue that IE always fails, and that really seems unpleasant to me.
Fortunately, there is a third option (also chosen by McGee (1989) ), which has my vote. Namely, the argument relies on the assumption that probabilities for nested conditionals obey the Conditionalization Thesis
rather than the regular Thesis
In light of the triviality results of section 2.2 it is hard to accept this extension since according to those results the conditional probability on the right-hand side cannot be understood as the updated probability function. In fact, it is not clear at all what P (B → C|A) does express. Besides the Ramsey test motivation for (42) it is also some further appeal. For one, if BMR is assumed, then with the aid of Theorem 2.3, one may show that it is equivalent to IE. Consequently, it is this version of the Thesis that occurs in (McGee, 1989) where IE is assumed. Also, in a recent empirical study it gained more support than its competitor (41) (Douven & Verbrugge, 2013) . For these reasons I will hold on to IE and (42) in the remainder of this paper. 
Two new arguments against the Thesis
By rejecting the Conditionalization Thesis it may seem easier to dodge triviality results. However, it is well known that also when the Thesis is restricted to simple conditionals, there is still some tension for possible accounts of the conditional when one also accepts IE. Most (in)famous is perhaps McGee's account which reconciles the Thesis with IE by rejecting modus ponens (MP). This seems to me a price too high to pay. Thus the precise consequences of adopting the Thesis and IE deserves further study. To this end I will now introduce two theorems that, I claim, shed some light on the precise tension at hand. The first result relies on the assumption that the conditional has a meaning such that A → B is true whenever A and B are true. The second assumes instead MP: B is true whenever A and A → B are true. Obviously I do not endorse the view that these Theorems provide good arguments against the Thesis. The purpose of having them here is only to pave the way for showing what is wrong with them.
Theorem 3.2. Let L be a set of sentences closed under Boolean operations and that contains simple conditionals and nested conditionals of second order. Furthermore, suppose → satisfies IE and suppose that whenever A and B are true, then also A → B is true. Then there exists no probability function P on L that satisfies BMR and the Thesis for simple conditionals.
Proof. Suppose there is a probability function P that satisfies the requirements. For any pair A, B ∈ L the full range of possible probability assignments for Boolean combinations of A, B, A → B and (¬A ∨ ¬B) → (A → B) is given by A A → B r 1 q 1 p 1 r 2 q 2 p 2 r 3 q 3 p 3 r 4 q 4 p 4 r 1 q 1 p 1 r 2 q 2 p 2 r 3 q 3 p 3 r 4 q 4 p 4 (¬A ∨ ¬B) → (A → B) r 1 q 1 p 1 r 2 q 2 p 2 r 3 q 3 p 3 r 4 q 4 p 4 r 1 q 1 p 1 r 2 q 2 p 2 r 3 q 3 p 3 r 4 q 4 p 4 B
where the p i 's and q i 's are as before, and 0 ≤ r i ≤ 1, r i + r i = 1. According to IE (¬A ∨ ¬B) → (A → B) = (A ∧ ¬B) → B. Applying the Thesis to this simple conditional amounts to P ((¬A ∨ ¬B) → (A → B)) = 0. So r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = r 4 = 0. Furthermore, from the assumption it follows that A ∧ B ∧ ¬(A → B) is a logical impossibility, and so is (¬A ∨ ¬B) ∧ (A → B) ∧ ¬((¬A ∨ ¬B) → (A → B) ) and thus the corresponding subsets of possible worlds are empty. Incorporating these considerations amounts to
where use has been made of the additional consequence q 1 = q 2 = q 3 = q 4 = 1.
21 Of course there is a third option. Theorem 3.1 only argues that one cannot have both (41) and (42) and at least one has to be rejected. But one can easily reject both and enter a whole new world of possibilities.
It now follows immediately from the Thesis that
Thus p 1 + p 2 = 1 and P (¬A) = p 3 + p 4 = 0. Performing the same analysis again with A replaced by ¬A, one finds P (A) = 0. Consequently
which is a contradiction, and thus no probability function can satisfy the requirements.
Theorem 3.3. Let L be a set of sentences closed under Boolean operations and that contains simple conditionals and nested conditionals of second order. Furthermore, suppose → satisfies IE and MP. Then there exists no probability function P on L that satisfies BMR and the Thesis for simple conditionals.
Proof. Suppose there is a probability function P that satisfies the requirements. Let A, B ∈ L and let A ⊃ B denote the material implication. The full range of possible probability assignments for Boolean combinations of A, B, A → B and (
According to IE (A ⊃ B) → (A → B) = (A ∧ B) → B. Application of the Thesis to this simple conditional amounts to P ((A ⊃ B) → (A → B)) = 1. So r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = r 4 = 1. Furthermore, from MP it follows that A ∧ (A → B) ∧ ¬B is a logical impossibility, and so is
. Incorporation of these considerations amounts to
where use has been made of the additional consequence q 1 = q 2 = q 3 = q 4 = 0. It now follows immediately from the Thesis that
Consequently
and thus P (A) = 1. Perform the same analysis again with A replaced by ¬A and one finds P (¬A) = 1. This then leads to a contradiction. Thus no probability function can satisfy the requirements.
This last result can be seen as a rephrasing of an earlier result due to Gibbard (1981, p. 234-235) . He showed that if one assumes MP, IE and that A |= B implies that A → B is true, the conditional must be equal to the material implication A ⊃ B. One then obtains a contradiction in the present discussion by noting that the material implication does not satisfy the Thesis. Gibbard's additional assumption (in probabilistic form) may be seen as a consequence of the Thesis. That is, if A |= B, then the Thesis implies that P (A → B) = 1. In short, from MP, IE and the Thesis one can deduce P (A → B) = P (A ⊃ B) (see also (48)). The remainder of the proof of Theorem 3.3 can then be understood as a demonstration of the fact that the Thesis does not hold for the material implication.
Theorem 3.3 thus suggests that McGee (1989) had no choice but to reject MP. However, as mentioned earlier, I believe that MP can be maintained together with the Thesis and IE. Thus in the following two sections I argue how context-sensitivity can be used to circumvent the results presented here. In section 3.3 I first lay out how McGee's account of conditionals behaves with respect to the Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 and in particular how McGee embraces the violation of MP by considering one of his counterexamples. This same counterexample is then used to argue in favor of MP and to point out the hidden assumption in Theorem 3.3 to be rejected. In section 3.4 context-sensitivity will be used to further explicate this assumption and to show that the Thesis is compatible with IE and MP. Simultaneously, it is then shown that Theorem 3.2 can also be circumvented.
The tension with Modus Ponens
It is a noteworthy result that McGee (1989) provides a full probability calculus for right-nested conditionals and Boolean combinations thereof. In terms of the present framework used, this means that he provides values for all the q i , r i , etc. for given p i . For example, on McGee's account, the values for the q i 's in the Karnaugh map (6) become If a Republican wins the election, then if it's not Reagan who wins it will be Anderson. A Republican will win the election.
Yet they did not have reason to believe
If it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson. (McGee, 1985, p. 462) .
To get a better grip on this example it is insightful to see how the probability of the conclusion relies on the probabilities of the two assumptions. Setting R='Reagan wins', C='Carter wins' and A='Anderson wins' and assuming that these sentences are mutually exclusive and together constitute all possibilities one may show that
Now if P (¬C) tends to 1 (as suggested in the example), then P (C) tends to 0 and thus 24 P (¬R → A) tends to 1 as well. Thus it seems that MP actually does hold for the present example, and one should have reason to believe that if it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson. The crux lies in the assumption that ¬C has high probability, where it is not specified what this means.
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In fact, on closer inspection it seems that this probability should not be too high since the story 23 The calculation is as follows.
suggests that at any rate P (C) > P (A). Thus P (¬C) is considered high because P (R) is high, but it is not high compared to P (¬A). The persistence of MP in this form is more general. Consider the situation where P (A) = 1 and P (A → (B → C)) = 1. One then has (assuming IE)
In other words, if one fully believes the antecedent and the nested conditional, one must also fully believe the single conditional. But does this imply that MP holds or not? I think it does. In fact, I think that the way in which MP does hold (i.e., (56)) is more true to the idea that MP is an inference rule (describing a process) rather than a (static) logical law. Thus I propose to reformulate MP as On this dynamical reading of MP, the context-sensitive interpretation of the conditional again becomes relevant. In the following section the notation introduced in section 2.4 is used again to make this context-sensitivity explicit. Then, with the use of this notation, I show in what sense the Thesis can be maintained together with IE and MP.
The dynamics of nested conditionals
When one infers φ from the assumptions A and A → φ, this conclusion is obtained in a context in which these assumptions hold. More generally, inference affects the context. And this is particularly important when the conclusion itself concerns a conditional. To illustrate, the conditional B → C which can be inferred from A and A → (B → C) using MP, is of the form B 
This is fully in line with Ramsey's proposal; evaluating A → (B → C) requires adding A to the stock of belief, and then use that basis to evaluate B → C (c.f. the discussion below Theorem 3.1). On this notation IE now reads
Of course, introducing the notation (57) in itself doesn't establish anything on the formal level. In particular (as also noted in footnote 14), it should not be interpreted as "making a special choice out of all the elements of the form A What the notation (57) does establish, however, is that although I originally presented the Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 as ones avoiding the assumption of the fixed interpretation, this assumption has been smuggled in through the back door with IE. Indeed, the first line of (39) in the proof of Theorem 3.1 can now be seen to mix up two contexts. The left-hand side can be reformulated to
while the right-hand side becomes
And surely the two sets vA C − → Bw and vA
− − → Bw need not coincide. This issue is in line with the earlier complaint that the right-hand side of (41) doesn't express a probability, which is here emphasized by noting that in (59) two contexts are being mixed up. On the technical side, the objection is that there is no clear motivation for the relation
to hold. The objections against Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 are more subtle. Each of these theorems assume that a certain intersection of sets of possible worlds should be empty, namely,
and
respectively. The assumption to be attacked is that these relations are supposed to hold for all contexts C. On the other hand, MP for example, requires only that the set in (63) gets assigned measure zero for contexts C that satisfy
In other words, it is sufficient to only assume the set in (63) is empty for contexts that satisfy C = C A . It may be noted that although the tension with MP only became apparent when turning to nested conditionals, the same issue applies to simple conditionals. Indeed, the Thesis itself already implies that if P C (A) = P C (A C − → B) = 1, then P C (B) = 1. There was no need to require that q 1 = 0 in the Karnaugh map (6) for all admissible probability functions.
It should be emphasized that the introduction of mid-sentence context changes is not just a technical trick to escape the discussed theorems. For example, in the case of MP, the context change actually emphasizes the earlier criticism against McGee's conclusion that MP fails. It is precisely because it is a dynamic rule that it can't be captured by a static constraint on the set of possible worlds. The example of the presidential election fits well with this observation. Taking again R, C and A to stand for "president X wins the election" (with X ranging over the values (R)eagan, (C)arter and (A)nderson), the two sentences that get initial high probability are 
On the other hand, it seems that ¬R C − → A
has a low probability. 26 But as may be clear by now, this can only be seen to be in contradiction with MP if one assumes that v¬R
26 Note that it is precisely the probability of this conditional that is expressed by (55).
The precise forms of rules like IE and MP in the contextual framework of course depend again on how the different contexts are related. For example, how does the set of possible worlds 
and the conflict with MP immediately vanishes. To be precise, this relation implies that 
for all contexts C, thereby ensuring that B → C gets assigned probability one in the right contexts. To summarize, I have argued that the Ramsey test suggests a dynamic reading of the conditional. Taking up the lesson from section 2 that in a dynamic setting, changes in the interpretation of conditionals should be taken into account, I have suggested that nested conditionals exhibit midsentence context changes. This is emphasized in the notation introduced in (57). The upshot is that, by introducing context-sensitivity, assumptions on inference rules (like MP) can be adopted more clearly and be shown to be compatible with the Thesis.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have shown that quite a number of arguments against the Thesis can be disarmed by introducing a context-sensitive reading of the conditional. This sensitivity did not just drop out of the sky, but was motivated in tandem with the Thesis itself, i.e., by the Ramsey test. In that sense, I feel it is only natural to adopt a context-sensitive approach when defending the Thesis.
But besides disarming arguments against the Thesis, I have also suggested a way of keeping track of the context which provides a framework in which one can meaningfully uphold the Thesis, IE, MP and BR (provided a proper re-interpretation of these rules). Irrespective of whether this provides a satisfactory account of the conditional (undoubtedly there are problems lurking around not touched upon in this paper), it shows that the question of the tenability of the Thesis is far from being an open-and-shut case. And precisely because of this point I have refrained from defending any particular account of the conditional and context-sensitivity. Instead, the notion of context-sensitivity introduced here is aimed at setting the contours for tenability of the Thesis.
But apart from advocating the tenability of the Thesis, this paper can also be taken to advocate the embrace of context-sensitivity more generally. Indeed, whenever it was used to provide insight on the assumptions entering in an argument against the Thesis, it also provided insight on the use of a conditional. For example, the idea that a dynamic reading of MP should take into account context changes, stands independent of whether one believes the Thesis to be true. And I believe that such ideas will be valuable for future research.
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